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UPDATING VIRGINIA'S PROBATE LAW
Thomas S. Word, Jr.*
T HE estate of the average Virginian today is much more complex
and diversified than the estate of the nineteenth century Virginia
citizen, and consequently, problems of modem probate have become in-
creasingly complicated. In 1870 the typical Virginian farmed, and land
was the chief measure of his wealth. The farm, livestock, and household
furnishings were normally the extent of his estate. Income and death
taxes were unknown, and trusts were rare.
Today, however, Virginia's economy has become urban and indus-
trial. The typical Virginia estate of the 1970's consists of a suburban
residence (well mortgaged), life insurance proceeds, employee bene-
fits, savings accounts, marketable securities, and perhaps a closely held
business interest. Death taxes are a consideration for even the moder-
ately well-to-do, and as a result, trusts have taken on major significance
and corporate fiduciaries aggressively seek trust business. Despite these
changes, however, Virginia's probate law-the rules governing de-
cedents' estates, trusts, and the estates of minors and incompetents-
remains little changed from that of one hundred years ago.
American probate law has recently come under severe attack for
alleged inefficiencies and unfairness. Undue expenses, red tape, and de-
lay are charged, resulting in increased pressure for reform.1 After seven
years of study, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, working with the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section of the American Bar Association, has promulgated a Uniform
Probate Code2 (hereinafter called the "Code") designed to meet these
complaints while providing adequate protection for fiduciaries and bene-
ficiaries. Since the Code represents a comprehensive and modem ap-
proach to the problem, it should afford a basis for comparison and sug-
gest weaknesses or strengths in Virginia's law.
6Member of the Virginia Bar. B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 1959; LL.B.,
Richmond, 1961.
1See generally N. DACEY, How To AvoiD PROBATE (1965); M. BLooM, ThE TROUBLE
WrIm LAWYERS (1969).
2 The entire text of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (hereinafter cited as U.P.C.) is in-
cluded in 1 P.H. EST. PLAN. (1969).
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I. DECEDENTS' ESTATES GENERALLY
The continuing public indictment of probate bench and bar can be
traced largely to solemn form probate, the customary procedure in
many states under which the probate court, in inter partes proceedings,
supervises the personal representative in each step of administration.
Solemn form probate is basically the settlement of an estate in a law-
suit, with motions and orders, hearings and appearances, and guardians
ad litem or special guardians, as they are sometimes called, all along
the way.
To meet complaints about this procedure, and at the same time to
protect fiduciaries and give them guidance where needed, the Code
adopts two parallel systems for the initial probate and qualification of
the personal representative-called formal testacy proceedings and in-
formal testacy proceedingss-and for estate administration-called super-
vised administration and unsupervised administration.
4
Informal testacy proceedings under the Code are strikingly similar
to the usual ex parte probate proceedings in Virginia. Under the Code,
an executor may generally probate the will and qualify without no-
tice to anyone.' He is then required to give notice by mail within
thirty days to each person who is apparently interested under the
will and to publish notice to creditors in a newspaper." Also, he must
within three months send a copy of an inventory of the estate to
interested persons who request it, or he may, but is not required to,
file it with the clerk.7
Upon qualification under the Code, the personal representative gains
broad discretionary powers.' He may compromise claims, borrow
money, satisfy charitable pledges, employ agents, and sell real or per-
sonal property. He may continue an unincorporated business for four
months in his own discretion, and thereafter with court approval; he
3 U.P.C. §§ 1-201(o), 3-401 to -414 (formal proceedings); §§ 1-201(s), 3-301 to -311
(informal proceedings).
4U.P.C. §§ 1-201 (pp) and 3-501 to -505 deal with supervised administration, and
prescribe the restrictions imposed upon the supervised personal representative and the
procedures to be followed by him to obtain authorization. Unless the order of ap-
pointment specifies further restriction, the only step which the supervised personal
representative must subject to formal adjudication is distribution, and any additional
restrictions on his powers must be endorsed on his letters of appointment. U.P.C.
§ 3-504.
5 U.P.C. §§ 3-306, -310.
- U.P.C. § 3-705, -801.
7 U.P.C. 1 3-706.
8 U.P.C. §§3-701 to -721.
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may in his own discretion incorporate the business and continue it
throughout the period of adminstration, if no adult beneficiary ob-
jects.9 No bond is required of the personal representative unless re-
quested by an interested party or deemed appropriate by the court.1°
When administration is complete, the personal representative may file
a simple statement to that effect with the court." He may exercise all
these powers in his discretion and without prior specific court ap-
proval.1
2
A fearful beneficiary may gain protection against acts of the personal
representative by requesting supervised administration,'3 or by requesting
an adjudication by the court on a particular matter of administration.'4 A
fearful or uncertain personal representative may gain court protection or
guidance on his own motion by requesting supervised administration, or
by requesting an adjudication by the court on a particular matter of
administration.' 5 Supervised administration will not be granted, how-
ever, unless the testator has requested it or unless it appears to the
court to be justified under the circumstances; a disgruntled beneficiary
is not permitted to complicate administration as a matter of spite.16
Virginia's procedures are much like informal proceedings and un-
supervised administration under the Code. Proof of the will and qualifi-
cation are customarily ex parte,17 although interested persons may be
made parties and thus bound.'8 As under the Code, these matters are
usually handled by the clerk with little formality.9 Unlike informal
proceedings under the Code, the Virginia personal representative must
file an inventory and accounting of receipts and disbursements with
the commissioner of accounts, an administrative officer of the court.20
The commissioner acts as a public auditor of these accounts, but on an
9 U.P.C. § 3-715.
10 U.P.C. §§ 3-603, -605.
11 U.P.C. § 3-1003.
12 U.P.C. § 3-704.
'3 U.P.C. § 3-502.
14 U.P.C. § 3-105.
11 U.P.C. H§ 3-704, -105.
16 U.P.C. § 3-502.
17 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-85 (1968).
18 VA. CODE ANN. §5 64.1-79 to -81, -88 (1968).
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-77 (1968).
20 VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 26-12, -17. A personal representative who is the sole beneficiary
or distributee, or sole residuary legatee, may file a statement that he has discharged
his duties in lieu of a formal accounting. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-20.1 (1960).
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ex parte basis. Formal inter partes proceedings for the approval of
fiduciary accounts are rare in Virginia.2'
The Virginia personal representative may get the guidance and pro-
tection of the court on any doubtful matter by a suit in equity for
advice and guidance.22 The procedure is little different from the Code's
provisions permitting a personal representative in unsupervised adminis-
tration to obtain an adjudication, after notice to beneficiaries, on a par-
ticular point without invoking full supervised administration.2 In the
rare instance when a Virginia fiduciary wishes protection every step
of the way, as may be the case with an insolvent estate, he may pro-
ceed in equity in a suit for complete administration, the equivalent of
supervised administration under the Code.24
Thus, from the standpoint of simplicity of procedure, Virginia's law
measures well by the standard of the Code. There are, however, some
specific areas in which Virginia's probate laws have not kept pace with
the changing times.
Powers of the Personal Representative
The Virginia personal representative may be hamstrung by lack of
administrative powers, absent a well-drawn will. Historically, the
powers of a personal representative have been limited, perhaps on the
theory of protecting beneficiaries from his bad judgment. Only to a
very limited extent can he sell land, 5 borrow money, or even renew
obligations. 6 He may continue a business only long enough to wind
it up, no matter how profitableY.2 He cannot sell personal property un-
less it is "likely to be impaired in value by keeping" 28 or unless the
proceeds are needed to pay charges.29
Are these restrictions in the best interests of beneficiaries in light of
today's circumstances? Perhaps sometimes, but lawyers seem to dis-
agree, for nearly every attested will contains provisions giving the per-
sonal representative powers to override the law's restrictions. The his-
21 See B. LAMB, VIRGINIA PROBATE PRACTICE § 135 (1957).
221d. §§ 129-33.
23 U.P.C. § 3-704, -105.
24 See LAMB, supra note 21, §5 134-37.
25 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-146 (1968); Virginia Trust Co. v. Evans, 193 Va. 425, 69
S.E.2d 409 (1952) (dictum).
26 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-143 (1968).
27Davis v. Christian, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 11 (1859); Thurmond v. Guvan Valley
Coal Co., 85 W.Va. 501, 102 S.E. 221 (1920).
2 8 VA. CODE A,.TN. § 64.1-154 (1968); Virginia Trust Co. v. Evans, 193 Va. 425,
69 S.E.2d 409 (1952).
29 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-155 (1968).
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toric restrictions are thus reserved for the intestate and the layman who
writes his own will.
The Code, in contrast, presumes that the individual would prefer his
personal representative to have power to do what is best under the
circumstances, without formal restrictions or distinctions between
legalistic classifications of wealth. The testator is left free to impose
any restrictions he wants by his will.30
Residence Requirements for Fiduciaries
The Code contains no residence requirements for fiduciaries.31 In
Virginia, non-resident individuals may not qualify as personal repre-
sentatives, except in conjunction with a Virginia resident individual or
a Virginia-based "corporation authorized to do business in Virginia." 32
The Virginia testator who leaves an uncomplicated estate in fee simple
to his son living out of state must appoint someone to serve with the
son or in his stead as personal representative. In earlier times, distance
and difficulty of travel made it hard for creditors and beneficiaries to
deal with a non-resident personal representative. Our present mobility,
and a requirement that the personal representative submit to the juris-
diction of Virginia courts for suit purposes, eliminate these objections.
Foreign banks and trust companies are prohibited from acting as
personal representatives or trustees under wills of Virginia decedents,
either alone or in conjunction with another.3 3 Virginia residents with
banking connections elsewhere must, therefore, test the ingenuity of
their lawyers. The use of a revocable inter vivos trust when a will
would better serve,34 or the naming of "strawman" personal representa-
tives and trustees who hire out-of-state banks as their agents, is often
the result.
The testator's wishes and free competition aside, there may be other
justifications for doing away with the prohibition of non-resident
fiduciaries. If Virginia did not have its restrictive statutes, Virginia-
30U.P.C. § 3-701 to -721 set forth the powers and duties of a personal repre-
sentative.
31 U.P.C. § 3-602 provides that a personal representative by acceptance of appoint-
ment submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any suit relating to the
estate.
32 VA. CoDE- ANN. § 26-59 (1969).
33 Id.
34 For a discussion of income tax problems created by the use of a revocable inter
vivos trust in the place of a will, see Postmortem Income Tax Aspects of the Living
Trust, 4 REAL Paop. PROB. & TRasr L.J. 339 (1969).
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based banks could serve as fiduciaries in a number of states which have
reciprocal statutes permitting out-of-state corporate fiduciaries to serve
if the foreign bank's state likewise permits banks of the reciprocating
state to serve. Such statutes have been adopted by several states.35
Statute of Limitations
There is no statute of limitations on the probate of an after-dis-
covered will in Virginia.36 Personal representatives are protected in
making distribution if they have no knowledge of another will, but
beneficiaries may find years later that they must give up an inheritance.
Under the Code, a will must generally be presented for probate with-
in three years of the decedent's death, and beneficiaries by intestacy
or a prior will are thereafter vested indefeasibly.
38
Adopted Persons
While Virginia's law corresponds basically with the Code's as to
the rights of adopted persons in intestacy and affords certainty,39 the
right of an adopted beneficiary under a will occupying the status of
"heir," "issue," "descendant," "child," or "grandchild" is not nearly
so clear. The Virginia cases, although not altogether consistent, gen-
erally indicate that the use of "issue" connotes blood kin only.40 The
court has, however, relied heavily on the particular facts of a case,
35 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132 (Cum. Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
§ 106 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-610 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
36 See Hawkins v. Tampa, 197 Va. 22, 87 S.E.2d 636 (1955); In re Bentley, 175 Va.
456, 9 S.E.2d 308 (1940); Bliss v. Spencer, 125 Va. 36, 57-58, 99 S.E. 593, 599 (1919).
37 See Bliss v. Spencer, 125 Va. 36, 99 S.E. 593 (1919); Carter v. Skillman, 108 Va.
204, 60 S.E. 775 (1908); Crauford v. Smith, 93 Va. 623, 23 SE. 235 (1895).
38 U.P.C. § 3-108. If fraud is involved, a proceeding may be commenced within
two years after discovery of the fraud, but no proceeding may be brought against
one not the perpetrator of the fraud later than five years from the commission
of the fraud. U.P.C. § 1-106.
39 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-234 (1968) and U.P.C. § 2-109 each provide that an
adopted child inherits from and through his adopting parent, and not his natural
parent, except that adoption by the spouse of a natural parent does not affect the
relationship of the child with his natural parents.
40 See, e.g., Merson v. Wood, 202 Va. 485, 117 S.E.2d 66 (1961) ("heir" held to
mean "heir of the body" or "issue," not including adopted child); Newsome v.
Scott, 200 Va. 833, 108 S.E.2d 369 (1959); Mott v. National Bank of Commerce, 190
Va. 1006, 59 S.E.2d 97 (1950); Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409, 69 S.E.2d 433 (1946);
Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39, 192 SE. 748 (1937) ("legal heir" held to include
adopted child); Munday v. Munday, 164 Va. 145, 178 SE. 917 (1935) ("issue" held not
to include adopted persons).
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especially the feelings of the testator toward the individual concerned.
In view of the frequency of adoption today (particularly in the case of
adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent), a statutory rule
of construction of wills (and deeds) providing that persons adopted
while they are under the age of twenty-one years take unless expressly




Small estates have long been a problem for Virginia lawyers and
beneficiaries alike. Unless the estate is under $2,500 and the judge can
be persuaded to handle distribution through a small fund order,43 the
full, probate procedure of qualification, inventory, and accounting
is required for the smallest Virginia estate, even though all beneficiaries
are adults. The frustrating experience of having to qualify on an estate
and go through this time-consuming and expensive procedure, solely
for the purpose of transferring a few shares of stock or obtaining funds
from a bank account, has caused many a Virginia citizen to think less
of the law and lawyers.
The Code meets this problem by permitting persons having assets
belonging to a decedent to deliver or transfer them to the successor or
successors of the decedent thirty days after the decedent's death on
the basis of an affidavit. 3 The affidavit is made by the successors and
must state that (i) the estate, less liens and encumbrances, does not
exceed $5,000; (ii) no personal representative has been appointed; and
(iii) the successors are entitled to the property.44 Persons dealing with
the successors are thereby protected. A similar procedure would seem
appropriate for Virginia.
Joint Bank Accounts
Ownership of joint bank accounts upon the death of a joint de-
positor constantly erupts into litigation in Virginia. The Supreme
Court of Appeals has passed on six such cases since 1955, 45 but this is
41 U.P.C. § 2-611.
42 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-750 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
43 U.P.C. § 3-1201.
44Id.
45 Haynes v. Hurt, 209 Va. 447, 164 S.E.2d 671 (1968); Wilkinson v. Witherspoon,
206 Va. 297, 142 S.E.2d 478 (1965); Stevens v. Sparks, 205 Va. 128, 135 S.E.2d 140
(1964); Quesenberry v. Funk, 203 Va. 619, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962); Wrenn v. Daniels,
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only a small indication of the number of similar controversies that have
been compromised or decided in lower courts.
Under present Virginia law rights of ownership in joint accounts
upon the death of a depositor, except in the case of husband and wife
accounts, have been said to depend upon the intention of the parties
and the terms of the deposit contract-fruitful objects of litigation.46 In
many cases, these accounts are created without any real understanding
of the deposit contract, and without any satisfactory evidence of the
parties' intent.
In the case of joint accounts between husband and wife, the General
Assembly has settled the question by providing that ownership vests
absolutely in the surviving spouse." This has achieved the desirable
certainty and, in view of the relationship, probably carries out the indi-
vidual's intentions in most cases. Perhaps a similar rule should apply
to joint accounts between other persons, but presumably the General
Assembly has feared unjust results in individual cases.
The Code attempts to solve the problem by providing that sums
remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account belong
to the surviving joint depositor, unless there is "clear and convincing
evidence" of a different intention at the time the account is created.48
If a right of survivorship is expressly stated in the terms of the account,
that right cannot be changed by will.49 The Code also deals compre-
hensively with payable-on-death (P.O.D.) accounts and accounts in
the name of a trustee (so-called Totten trust accounts).50
Intestate Succession
Few would argue with the proposition that the laws governing
intestate succession should follow the presumed intention of the
"average man" for the devolution of his property. Based on the usual
content of wills of persons with modest estates, the framers of the
Code have provided that upon intestacy the surviving spouse generally
receives the first $50,000 of the estate, with the balance divided equally
between the surviving spouse and the deceased spouse's issue, or if none,
200 Va. 419, 106 S.E.2d 126 (1958); King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141
(1955).
46 See cases cited note 47 supra.
47 VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-73 (1966).
48 U.P.C. § 6-104.
49 U.P.C. § 6-104(e).
50 U.P.C. § 6-101 (j), (n).
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the deceased spouse's parents. If there are no issue and no parents of the
deceased spouse, the surviving spouse takes all.51
Virginia's laws governing intestate succession give to the surviving
spouse one-third of the decedents personal estate, with the balance
passing to his issue; if there are no issue, the surviving spouse takes
all. 2 In the case of real estate, the surviving spouse takes a life interest
in one-third, with the balance passing to issue.58 Again, if there are
no issue, the surviving spouse takes all. 54 By an unusual quirk in Vir-
ginia's laws governing intestate personalty, a surviving spouse in the
case of partial intestacy will receive only what the will specifically
provides for him or her (subject to the rights upon renunciation). 5
Thus, in the not unusual case of a layman who dies partially intestate
with a holographic will specifying certain items for his wife and not
mentioning the balance, the wife will receive nothing more of the
personal property than is specified for her in the will, even though
the testator's nearest relatives may be second cousinsYr6
Under Virginia's intestate laws, kinship is traced to the furthest
possible degree, with the result that distant relatives who did not know
the decedent may find themselves unexpected heirs.57 The Code carries
kinship no further than grandparents and issue of grandparents; if no
persons are living within this degree of kinship, the estate escheats.5
Under Virginia's intestacy statutes, relatives of the half blood inherit
only half as much as those of the whole blood.5 9 Under the Code, rela-
tives of the half blood inherit in the same manner as relatives of the
whole blood. 0 With the common occurrence of half-brother and half-
sister relationships due to the frequency of divorce and remarriage
in our society, the Code's provisions may come closer to carrying out
the presumed intention of a majority, but the point is arguable.
The Code does away with advancements unless the decedent has
declared in a contemporaneous writing that a gift is intended as an ad-
vancement, or the heir acknowledges an advancement in writing.6' In
51 U.P.C. §§ 2-102, -103.
52 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-11 (1968).
53 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (1968).
54 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1968).
55 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (1968).
5 0 Newton v. Newton, 199 Va. 785, 102 S.E.2d 312 (1958).
5 7 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-1 (1968).
58 U.P.C. § 2-103, -105.
59 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-2 (1968).
60 U.P.C. § 2-107.
61 U.P.C. § 2-110.
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view of the current frequency of gifts, often motivated by tax con-
siderations, the Code's provision would appear to reflect more nearly
the presumed intention of decedents. Virginia's statutes concerning ad-
vancements have recently been amended to do away with presumptions
concerning advancements, but advancements may still be proven by
parol or other evidence.2
Property Rights of Spouse Electing to Take Against Will
Abolition of the distinction between real and personal property and
the resulting abolition of dower and curtesy is the Code's most radical
departure from Virginia law.63 Under the Code, an individual is free
to dispose of real or personal property during his lifetime without the
concurrence of a spouse, and no distinction is made between the two
classes of property for purposes of estate administration or intestate
succession.
The Code deals comprehensively with the rights of a surviving
spouse in the estate of a decedent.6 4 It introduces a concept of an
"augmented estate," 65 which is defined as the decedent's net probate
estate, plus certain transfers made by him during his marriage or out-
side his probate estate on death (a) to persons other than his surviving
spouse, and (b) to the surviving spouse. Property transferred by the
decedent during his lifetime to a person other than the surviving spouse
is included in the augmented estate if the decedent retained income
rights, invasion rights, or survivorship rights; also included are gifts
made within two years of death to the extent of more than $3,000 per
year to one donee. Life insurance proceeds and pension payments pay-
able to a person other than the surviving spouse are not included.6
Property transferred by the decedent during his lifetime or outside pro-
bate on his death to his spouse is included whether or not the decedent
retained any rights. For example, a trust created by the decedent for his
spouse during lifetime, property appointed to the spouse under a power
of appointment, proceeds of insurance payable to the spouse attributable
to premiums paid by the decedent or his employer, and the decedent's
retirement benefits are all regarded as part of the augmented estate.
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-63 (1968).
63 U.P.C. § 1-201 (hh) defines "property" to include real and personal property.
U.P.C. § 2-113 abolishes dower and curtesy.
64 U.P.C. §§ 2-201 to -207.
65 U.P.C. § 2-202.
66 Id.
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The spouse who elects to take against the will receives an amount
equal to one-third of the augmented estate, but is charged with the
amount of the augmented estate which she has already received.61 The
Code's approach thus avoids the unjust case of a spouse who has re-
ceived substantial benefits from the decedent (as, for example, through
life insurance proceeds, employee benefits, joint bank accounts or
jointly held real property), but who can nevertheless elect to take a
substantial share of the probate estate which the decedent wished to pass
to his children.
8
It can be argued that by abolishing dower and curtesy and permitting
free alienation of real property, the surviving spouse may be effectively
cut out of any meaningful share of the decedent's wealth. Present Vir-
ginia law, however, permits even greater latitude than the Code to a
resourceful spouse with respect to personal property, as illustrated in
Dillon v. Gow. 9 In that case, the husband, on his death bed, defeated
his wife's elective share by transferring assets to an irrevocable trust
under which he retained the right to income for life, the right to re-
ceive principal for his needs in the trustee's discretion, and the right
to appoint by his will the remainder interest in the trust to any person
other than himself, his estate, and his creditors. Under the Code, the
trust created by the husband would have constituted a part of the
augmented estate, and the wife would have had elective rights with
respect to it, since the husband retained the income right for life.70
In view of the relative economic insignificance of dower and curtesy
in the typical estate today, the safeguard afforded the surviving spouse
is insignificant. The Code's provisions afford far better protection for
the surviving spouse in the usual modern case.
71
67 U.P.C. §§ 2-201, -207.
08 The purpose of the concept of augmenting the probate estate in computing
the elective share is twofold: (1) to prevent the owner of wealth from mak-
ing arrangements which transmit his property to others by means other than
probate deliberately to defeat the right of the surviving spouse to a share,
and (2) to prevent the surviving spouse from electing a share of the probate
estate when the spouse has received a fair share of the total wealth of
the decedent .... U.P.C. § 2-202, Comment.
(9 2 OPINIONS OF BROCKtENBROUGH LAMi 78 (Richmond Ch., 1956).
10 U.P.C. § 202 (a) (1).
71 Aboition of dower and curtesy and the distinctions between real and personal
property have been advocated for Virginia. See Lewis, It's Time to Abolish Dower and
Curtesy in Virginia, 3 U. RICH. L. REv. 299 (1969); Spies, Property Rights of the Sur-
viving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REV. 157 (1960). In 1967, the Virginia Advisory Legislative
Council studied the problem and recommended that dower and curtesy be con-
verted into a fee simple estate. REPORT OF THE VALC To THE GOVERNOR AND THE
GENERAL AssErmLY OF VIRGINIA ON COmASSIONERS OF Accou-Trs AND FIUCIARIES
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Simultaneous Death
Death as a result of common accident is a haunting fear for today's
Virginian. Under present Virginia intestacy laws, the sequence of
deaths, although they may vary only an instant or a few minutes, may
well determine which spouse's family receives a substantial estate. Take,
for example, the case of a childless and intestate husband and wife who
are traveling together and die as a result of an accident, with the wife
surviving for five minutes longer than the husband. The husband's entire
estate thus passes to the wife and on to the wife's relatives, although the
husband may have originated all of the wealth. The Code meets this
problem by providing that a person is not deemed to survive for pur-
poses of intestate succession unless he survives for one hundred-twenty
hours.72 A similar rule of construction is provided for wills, unless the
will provides otherwise.
73
II. ESTATES OF MmoRs AND INCAPACITATED PERSONS
Virginia's procedural laws concerning the protection of minors and
incapacitated persons, like Virginia's procedures concerning decedents'
estates, are uncomplicated in their administration.74 As in the case of laws
governing decedents' estates, however, the powers of a Virginia guardian
or committee are rather severely limited. A guardian or committee may
not sell or lease the ward's real property.73 The guardian of a minor may
not spend beyond income for the ward's maintenance and education
without the advance approval of the court in a formal proceeding.70 If
the real property of an incapacitated person or minor is to be sold,
leased or encumbered, the fiduciary must bring a highly technical statu-
tory court proceeding with presumptive heirs as parties. 77 If the prop-
erty is sold by the court, the proceeds must be invested and disbursed
by the court, rather than turned over to the fiduciary for management
in the same manner as the ward's personal estate. 8
The Code deals comprehensively with the protection of persons under
disability and minors and their property in article V. Two separate
(1967). The Bill introduced for this purpose, however, (Senate Bill Number 275) was
not reported out of the Courts of Justice Committee.
72 U.P.C. § 2-104.
73 U.P.C. § 2-601.
74 VA. CODE AN'. 99 31-4 to -6 (1969).
75 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-675, -677 (1957).
7 6 VA. CODE ANN. § 31-10 (1969).
7 7 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-675, -677 (1957).
7S VA. CODE ANN. § 8-685 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
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fiduciary relationships are created for the protection of minors and in-
capacitated persons. The first is "guardian and ward," under which the
guardian is given powers and responsibilities similar to those of a parent
in order to deal with the ward's personal needs and day-to-day welfare.79
The second is "conservator-protected person," under which the con-
servator is given broad discretionary management powers and duties with
respect to the protected person's property, similar to the powers of the
personal representative of a decedent under the Code.8°
The Code also introduces a "facility of payment" provision which per-
mits anyone under a duty to pay or deliver money or personal prop-
erty to a minor in amounts of not more than $5,000 per annum to pay
or deliver (i) directly to the minor if he has attained age 18 or is
married, or (ii) to any person having the care and custody of the minor
with whom the minor resides, or (iii) to a guardian of the minor, or
(iv) to a financial institution in the form of a deposit in an insured
savings account in the sole name of the minor."' Any person to whom
property is paid under this provision is charged with the duty of ap-
plying the funds to the support and education of the minor and retain-
ing the rest for delivery to the minor upon his attaining majority. The
purpose of the section is to avoid the expense of protective proceedings
for a minor with limited funds.
The Code permits a parent to designate a guardian of a minor child
by will, and the appointment becomes effective upon acceptance of
the guardianship in writing. 2 The court may also appoint a guardian
for a minor.83 The duties of a guardian are basically those of a parent,
and he is charged with the duty t6 take care of the ward's personal ef-
fects and to commence protective proceedings to protect other prop-
erty, if necessary. He is authorized to receive funds due the minor
(without limitation as to amount), and he is charged with the duty of
applying the funds to the minor's support, care and education. Any ex-
cess must be conserved for the ward's future needs unless a conservator
has been appointed for the minor, in which case the excess is paid over
annually to the conservator. The guardian is not entitled to compen-
sation unless specially awarded by the court. Thus the guardian, if he
is sufficiently brave, can care for the ward's personal needs as well as
his financial affairs. Unlike the conservator, however, he does not have
79 U.P.C. §§ 5-201 to -313.
80 U.P.C. §§ 5-401 to -431.
81 U.P.C. § 5-103.
82 U.P.C. § 5-201. Compare VA. CoDE AN,. § 31-2 (1969).
83 U.P.C. § 5-204.
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broad management powers with respect to the ward's property. Ac-
cordingly, if the infant's financial affairs are at all complicated, it will
probably be necessary to appoint a conservator.
The basic framework for protection of incapacitated persons under
the Code parallels that for minors. The guardian of an incapacitated
person has powers and responsibilities comparable to those of a guardian
of a minor; the conservator has identical powers in the case of an in-
capacitated person and the case of a minor.8 4
The Code adopts a Virginia innovation-the power of attorney which
does not terminate upon disability of the principal. This deviation from
the common law was adopted by statute in Virginia in 1954.5 Under
it, an individual may provide that broad powers granted an attorney-in-
fact will continue after disability if the instrument of appointment so
states. The Code goes one step further and permits the instrument to
provide that it shall "become effective upon the disability of the
principal." 86 As a matter of practice in Virginia, this result has some-
times been obtained by having a power of attorney delivered to the
attorney-in-fact and then re-delivered in escrow to a third person who
is authorized to release it to the attorney-in-fact upon certification of
disability by a physician. As in Virginia, the attorney-in-fact under the
Code becomes accountable to the conservator, and the conservator has
the power to revoke the power of attorney. This provision has per-
mitted elderly persons facing senility or physical incapacity and their
families to avoid the expense and embarrassment of guardianship pro-
ceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
Virginia's probate system appears to work relatively well in practice,
and the principal causes for complaint in other states, aside from the
human failings of fiduciaries and their lawyers, do not exist in Virginia.
Virginia's probate laws do, however, leave something to be desired in
light of changes in forms of wealth and the relative unimportance of
real estate.
If we accept the basic premise of the framers of the Code-that the
probate law should be designed to carry out the presumed intention
of the average man concerning administration and distribution
of his estate or the handling of his affairs upon his incapacity
84 U.P.C. § 5-424.
85 VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (1964).
86 U.P.C. § 5-501.
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-formal restrictions and limitations on personal representatives',
guardians', or committees' powers should be removed and real and
personal property should be treated alike. The Uniform Commercial
Code has proven the advantage of a uniform, modem and comprehensive
code for commercial transactions. Perhaps the Uniform Probate Code
will someday afford a means to update Virginia's probate laws.
